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THE PLANNING GAME-ENGLISH STYLE
OR
THE GREATER LONDON
DEVELOPMENT PLAN
VICTOR MOORE*
Anglophiles will be aware that since the statute Quia Emptores in
the year 1290, no single piece of legislation has made as great an im-
pact on English land law as that brought about by the Town and
Country Planning Act of 1947.1 The lynchpin of that legislation,
which gave to England its first comprehensive statutory machinery
for controlling land use, was that no landowner could develop his
land without first obtaining permission from the local planning
authority.2 The content of the development plan which local plan-
ning authorities were required to prepare for their areas determined
whether permission would be granted, or granted subject to condi-
tions, or whether the planning authority would begin cease and
desist proceedings if development commenced without permission.'
The history of these development plans is well known. The framers
of the Act had intended that land use allocation in the plan should
be drawn with a "broad brush," avoiding any rigidity in detailed
zonings.4 Unfortunately, the language of the Act and the notational
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, University of Reading, England.
1. 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51.
2. Id. §§ 12-36.
3. Id. §§ 5-11.
4. REPORT OF THE PLANNING ADVISORY GROUP, THE FUTUPZ OF DEVELOP-
MENT PLANS 1:21 (H.M.S.O.) (1965).
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techniques adopted by the planners had precisely the reverse effect,
so that instead of development plans becoming a springboard for
positive planning by depicting future change, they rapidly became
little more than descriptions of existing land use. Worse still, even
though the defects had been recognised, plans could be amended
only after a prolonged statutory process had been followed.5 This
process included a consideration by the appropriate Minister of ob-
jections to the amendment before it was approved. By the middle of
the 1960's, it became obvious that things could not stay as they were.
In 1965, the Minister of Housing and Local Government, respon-
sible for the formulation of planning policy, indicted town and coun-
try planning in England on a number of grounds. The official view
was that the planning machinery had failed to come to grips early
enough with the population explosion or with the motor car; that
much of our rebuilding was depressing in the quality of its layout
and design; that the effects of re-development in some of our historic
towns was appalling; that the concentration on urban planning had
permitted the destruction of village life; that planning had created
the twin evils of land famine and famine prices for land around
every great city; and that planning organisation was a hierarchy of
centralised pontification and that the Minister himself was the arch
pontiff.6 The Town and Country Planning Act of 19687 represented
an attempt to remedy these defects by changing the form and content
of development plans and by altering the level of responsibility for
the making of planning decisions. These twin objectives were secured
by providing for the creation of a new style of development plan to
be prepared by the local planning authority at two levels instead of
one. First, at the higher level, there is now to be a "structure plan,"
intended to deal with the general lines of development in an area in
purely policy terms, applicable to such major land uses as housing,
education, recreation, transport and communications.8 Secondly, at
the lower level, there are to be "local plans," which, whilst conform-
5. Town & Country Planning Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 6.
6. 51 J. ROYAL TowN PLAN. INST. 206 (1965).
7. Town & Country Planning Act 1968, c. 72. The provisions of the 1968 Act
relating to development plans, which are now consolidated in the Town & Coun-
try Planning Act 1971, are based substantially on REPORT OF THE PLANNING AU-
vrsoRy GROUP, TE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANS (H.M.S.O.) (1965).
8. Town & Country Planning Act 1968, c. 72, §§ 1-5 (re-enacted in Town &
Country Planning Act 1971, c. 78, §§ 6-10).
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ing generally to the structure plan, will deal with the detailed plan-
ning of an area and the allocation of particular parcels of land for
particular purposes.9 The alteration in the level of responsibility
was secured by providing that only structure plans and amendments
thereto would need approval by the Minister.1 Local plans would
not need the imprint of Ministerial authority; instead, they would
come into effect after adoption by the local planning authority that
had prepared them. As had the 1947 Act, the new Act also provides
an opportunity for objections to be made to the plan. In the case
of a structure plan, the objections are considered by the Minister;
in the case of a local plan, by the local planning authority.1
The 1968 Act, however, introduced an entirely new element into
the preparation of development plans by requiring public participa-
tion at the formative stages.12 Instead of presenting the public with
a fait accompli, subject only to a consideration of public objections,
local planning authorities are required to take the public into their
confidence in determining the content of either a structure or a local
plan. The consolidated Town and Country Planning Act of 1971
now charges local planning authorities with insuring that adequate
publicity is given to matters intended to be included in a plan; also,
persons who may be expected to want to make representations about
those matters are to be made aware of their right to have an adequate
opportunity to do so. Then, once a plan has been prepared but be-
fore the objection procedure can be initiated, the local planning
authority must state the steps taken to comply with that publicity
duty and the consideration given to the views of persons who have
made representations. 13 It is against this background of change in
English town and country planning law that the development plan
for the Greater London area must be considered.
9. Id. §§ 6-10 (§§ 11-15).
10. The local plan may not be adopted "unless it conforms generally to the
structure plan as approved by the Minister." Id. § 9(2) (§ 14(2)). The Minister
responsible is now the Secretary of State for the Environment. STAT. INSTR. 1970,
No. 1681.
11. To-n & Country Planning Act 1968, c. 72, §§ 4, 8 (Town & Country
Planning Act 1971, c. 78, §§ 9, 13).
12. Id. §§ 4, 8 (§§ 9, 13).
13. Town & Country Planning Act 1971, c. 78, § 12. This seems a parallel
development to proposals of the Federal Transportation Department that instead
of one inquiry being held to consider objections to the route of a highway, there
should be two: one before the route is provisionally fixed and one after.
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Tm GREATER LONDON DEVELOPMENT PLAN
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
The structure of English local government has never been on pro-
bation. Until the substantial re-organisation now taking place under
the provisions of the Local Government Act of 1972,14 the system of
local government was predominantly a creature of the nineteenth
century which twentieth century pressures had failed to disturb.15
The wind of change first blew in 1957, when a Royal Commission
under Sir Edwin Herbert was appointed to examine and to make
recommendations upon the system and working of local government
in the Greater London Area. The Herbert Commission's proposalso
were given legislative effect by the London Government Act of 1963,
the purpose of which was to create "an overall authority to meet
needs which by their nature are needs of Greater London as a
whole."17
London was considered rather special, being an area which "differs
from the connurbations in the rest of the country by reason of its
size, density of population, history of growth and over-riding pre-
dominance of its one centre."18 The Act abolished almost all the old
units of local government in the London area and established in
their place the Greater London Council as the authority for strategic
functions in a new Greater London Area.'0 These strategic functions
were to include, inter alia, responsibility for roads, housing and plan-
ning.20 Local functions were to be dealt with by 32 London "bor-
oughs," with the City of London exercising that jurisdiction within
the area of its famous square mile.21
As far as planning was concerned, the new Greater London Council
inherited those parts of the development plans of the old authorities
which the Council had replaced. The development plan for the
14. Local Government Act 1972, c. 70.
15. See Hill, Local Government in Present-Day England, 4 URBAN LAW. 463
(1972).
16. REPORT OF GREAT BRITAIN ROYAL COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN GREATER LONDON, CMND. No. 1164 (1960) [hereinafter cited as HERBERT
COMMISSION REPORT].
17. 669 PAnL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) col. 49 (Dec. 10, 1962).
18. HERBERT COMMISSION REPORT para. 279.
19. London Government Act 1963, c. 33, § 2.
20. Id. § 2, sched. 2.
21. Id. §§ 3, 4.
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Greater London Area, therefore, began as something like a "patch-
work quilt," with a lack of cohesion between its respective parts.
The Herbert Commission foresaw this difficulty and concluded that
it was "essential that there should be one development plan for the
Greater London area as a whole."- Accordingly, the London Gov-
ernment Act of 1963 required the Greater London Council to prepare
a Greater London Development Plan and each London borough to
prepare a local development plan that would be consistent with the
Greater London plan. '-* The precise form and content of the plans
were to be dictated by regulations made by the responsible Minister,
and it was not until the first regulations were prepared in 196624
that it became apparent that the Greater London Development
Plan was to differ substantially from the type of development plan
prepared under the 1947 Act. By 1966, of course, the deficiencies of
these development plans were beginning to become apparent, so
that as far as the Greater London Development Plan was concerned
(but not the borough local plans), the regulations were intended to
mould it towards a form and style that was being envisaged for the
structure plans required by the Town and Country Planning Act of
1968. Indeed, the 1968 Act specifically provided that the Greater
London Development Plan, when approved, should be treated for
the purposes of the Act as a structure plan for Greater London.
2 5
Unfortunately, however, the Greater London Development Plan
could never have developed as envisaged in the 1968 Act. In the first
place, preparation of the Plan had proceeded too far to enable the
public to participate effectively in the formulation of the Plan's
proposals. As a result, there was little opportunity for the Plan to
be subjected to general criticism and possible amendment by the
authority before its submission to the Minister.26 In the second place,
the Plan could never have met the requirements now laid down for
22. HERBERT COMMuISSION .EPORT para. 765.
23. London Government Act 1963, c. 33, § 25.
24. STAT. INSTR. 1966, No. 48.
25. Town and Country Planning Act 1968, c. 72, sched. 1, para. 4.
26. The Council held 13 meetings which 6,000 people attended. There was a
tendency for the views of individuals to be submerged by views expressed by
vested interests. Furthermore, members of the public were inadequately informed
of the proposals to be discussed at the meetings. Methods of public participation
have now been amplified as a result of the report "People and Planning," which
was commissioned by the Government following the 1968 Act.
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other structure plans.27 The Report of the Panel of Inquiry into
the Plan saw three basic reasons for this. First, the detailed investi-
gation of the problems of an area that should precede the detailed
provisions of a structure plan was impossible for an area as large as
London. Secondly, the role given by the London Government Act
of 1963 to the London boroughs in preparing local development
plans meant that the Greater London plan could not deal with mat-
ters that elsewhere would be included within a structure plan.
Thirdly, the importance of London in the national economy ensured
that basic decisions about major interests in London must be the
concern of national government. 28
II. THE PROCEDURAL AsPEcTs
The Greater London Development Plan was submitted for ap-
proval to the Minister of Housing and Local Government in August
of 1969. In the following December, the Secretary of State for Local
Government and Regional Planning29 announced his intention of
holding a statutory inquiry into the Plan and objections made to it.
As independent chairman of the inquiry, the Secretary appointed
F. H. B. Layfield, Q.C., probably the country's foremost planning
silk. He was to be assisted by a panel that included an independent
transportation expert, an independent planner, and members of the
Ministry's own Inspectorate.30 In addition, this panel was to be as-
sisted by a number of outside assessors to help it probe and evaluate
policies contained in the Plan, objections made to those policies, and
possible alternative strategies. The Secretary of State described the
Plan as comprehensive, complex, and controversial.3s Few could dis-
27. In particular, the requirements of the non-statutory Development Plan
Manual prepared by the Department of the Environment in 1970.
28. 1 IEPORT OF PANEL OF INQUIRY INTO GREATER LONDON DEVELOPMENT
PLAN para. 2.11 (1973).
29. The Secretary acted as a kind of "overlord" to co-ordinate the activities
of several ministries, including the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.
When the present Conservative Government came to power, the office was
abandoned, although the Secretary of State for the Environment now exercises
similar functions with full legal responsibilities.
30. A body of persons who conduct inquiries on behalf of Ministers. Their
function is to ascertain facts and apply policy to those facts. The Minister is not
bound to follow his Inspector's recommendations.
31. 793 HousE oF COMMONS OFFICIAL REPORT col. 434 (Dec. 10, 1969).
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agree. Its controversial aspect was signified by the lodging of 28,392
objections by 19,997 objectors.32
The complexity of the issues involved, together with the duty
placed on the Panel to examine the Plan as well as objections to it,
required the proceedings of the inquiry to be organised with the
efficiency of a military operation. In order to ensure that both the
Panel and objectors understood the issues as clearly as possible, the
Panel divided the inquiry into three stages. Stage I consisted of the
opening presentation of the Plan by the Greater London Council,
followed by a consideration of the Plan's general strategies and the
objections made to those strategies. Stage II dealt with objections
that concerned local implications of the various strategies of the Plan.
This sometimes took place in sessions before individual members of
the Panel, assisted where appropriate by assessors. In this way it was
possible for the Panel to hold concurrent sessions at a number of
different locations. Stage III of the inquiry resumed as a general
session before the full Panel; it was devoted to an examination of
fresh evidence or research for which the Panel had asked during the
course of the proceedings and a further examination of the inter-
relationships of the various strategies in the Plan.33 Sessions in Stages
I and II were arranged according to subject matter: population;
housing; employment; transport; town and landscape; open land and
green belt; central London; town centres, shopping and markets; edu-
cation, hospitals and prisons; public utilities; standard controls, such
as density and noise; and general strategy and implementation.34
Objectors were kept precisely informed as to the organisation and
conduct of the proceedings. In order to ensure that objectors were
given the chance to appear personally if they so wished, they were
invited to state their intentions as to appearance. If objectors wished
to appear, they were informed of the stage of the inquiry to which
their objection had been allocated. Detailed and sometimes firm
guidance was given regarding the presentation of oral evidence. Ob-
jectors and their witnesses were asked to submit a proof of their evi-
dence to the Panel well in advance of their personal appearance.
32. Only 6,700 objections were made to the London County Council regarding
the County of London Development Plan prepared under the 1947 Act.
33. GREATER LONDON DEVELOPMENT PLAN INQUIRY PROCEDURE DOCUMENT
(Aug. 27, 1970).
34. Id.
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Representative organisations and groups were asked, so far as possible,
to put forward a common view in order to avoid repetition and
unnecessary cross-examination.
An objector's oral presentation of his case normally entailed a
lengthy process. The objector outlined and explained his objection;
the witnesses of the Greater London Council could be recalled for his
cross-examination, with re-examination by counsel for the Council;
the objector presented evidence in support of his objection and
any witnesses were examined, cross-examined and re-examined; the
Greater London Council presented evidence in answer to the objec-
tion; where appropriate, counsel for the Panel questioned the ob-
jector or witness; and the objector finally summarised his case and
indicated what action he was asking the Minister to take.8 ,
Quite apart from this mammoth and time-consuming task, the
Panel had to ensure that every objection to the Plan that had not
been withdrawn, and not merely those orally presented, would be
considered. In order to do this, the Panel prepared "objection pa-
pers." Each such paper collected all objections relating to a particular
section of the inquiry, regardless of whether objections were presented
orally, into a logical sequence related to the subject matter of the
Plan. For each section of the inquiry, therefore, the papers disclosed
all the relevant objections. Where objections were not supported
by oral testimony, the Greater London Council was required never-
theless to respond to them.
This short account of the procedural workings of the inquiry does
less than justice to the scale and complexity of the problems that had
to be resolved; the completion of the inquiry in 237 days is a tribute
to the way in which these problems were resolved. Yet in many ways
the writing has been upon the wall, and repeat performances are
likely to be restricted. One reason is that unlike the London plan,
future structure plans will be subjected to full public participation
from the moment their preparation begins. By the time the Minister
has to consider objections, the main contentious issues will have been
openly identified and discussed.
More immediate results have flowed from this inquiry. It has be-
come clear that many objections were related to the detailed appli-
cation of policies in the Plan rather than to the general strategy.
Furthermore, there was a considerable duplication of objections. The
35. Id.
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inquiry also brought into prominence for the first time the question
of the extent to which the consideration of objections to a structure
plan requires a judicial or quasi-judicial forum. The structure plan
is intended to form a link between regional economic planning and
town and country planning. As such, its content is likely to be in-
fluenced by regional strategies, none of which are subjected to exami-
nation in any judicial way. Although in law the position is far from
clear, by custom, inquiries into objections to development plans pre-
pared under the 1947 Act have come to be regarded as requiring a
quasi-judicial process.
The inquiry into the Greater London Development Plan shows
that it was not the most appropriate way of considering a structure
plan and objections formally made to it. Accordingly, the Town and
Country Planning (Amendment) Act of 1972 has amended the law
relating to the submission of such plans, providing that whilst the
Secretary of State remains obliged to consider all objections made to
a plan, he is not obliged to provide each objector with an opportunity
to take part in any public examination the Secretary may decide to
conduct. '; The objector's right to appear before an inquiry and orally
present his case has been replaced by a privilege dependent upon
invitation. Thus, the Secretary of State for Local Government and
Regional Planning is given the right to determine not only the mat-
ters to be examined but also the persons to be invited to take part
in that examination. The message is clear. Persons with common
interests, or those who have submitted objections of a like kind, are
more likely to be invited to take part in the public examination if
they join together with that purpose in mind. One further conse-
quence follows. By releasing structure plan examination from a pro-
cedural straitjacket, the examining body is free to invite any person
to attend who can contribute to the consideration of the Plan, in-
cluding supporters of the Plan's policies. The new procedure will
also enable the examining body to enquire fully into alternative
strategies and may lead to the injection of a considerable inquisitorial
element into the examination of structure plans.37
36. ToNwn & Country Planning (Amendment) Act 1972, c. 42, § 3.
37. See Moore, The Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act 1972, 37
CONVEY. (n.s.) 31 (1973).
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III. Ti-s PLANNING MERITS
Few people would go as far as one commentator in describing the
Plan as a "limp and futile document" or would allege that its "actual
policies . . . are minimal, badly reasoned, and loosely presented." 8
Nevertheless, the Report of the Panel contained many criticisms of
the Plan. The Report stated that the Plan failed to distinguish be-
tween material appropriate to a structure plan and material appro-
priate to a local plan; to present its aims meaningfully;38 to relate
policies to those aims; to disclose information obtained during the
formulation of the Plan; to give adequate consideration to proposals
to be carried out by agencies other than the Greater London Council;
and to limit its program in relation to the Council's ability to act.40
Usually, reports of important inquiries are published by the Gov-
ernment only after it has reached a decision on the issues involved.
In the case of the Greater London Development Plan, the Govern-
ment departed from this course. It decided early in 1973 to publish
the Panel's Report together with a statement that merely indicated
the Government's views on certain of the major issues. Nothing was
officially approved and the Government did not commit itself to any
specific modifications of the Plan that had been proposed by the
Panel. The Government's intention was to enunciate some of the
decisions of principle and general policy that were to guide it in
developing, in consultation with the Greater London Council and
other bodies, more detailed proposals for modifying the Plan.41 The
matters most urgently requiring this treatment were considered to be
population and employment, housing and transport, and traffic and
roads.42
38. Self, What's wrong with the GLC?, 37 TowN & COUNTRY PLAN. 194
(1969).
39. Compare, e.g., "The Council's main aims are . . . to give new inspiration
to the onward development of London's genius" with "The Council's policy is
the ... objective of improving public transport in all possible ways." 1 REPORT
OF PANEL OF INQUIRY INTO GREATER LONDON DEVELOPMENT PLAN paras. 2.16,
2.9 (1973).
40. Id. para. 2.17. The Panel saw structure plans "as documents bringing
together what is known to be happening and which contain the most accurate
forecasts, without their being distorted by hopeful projections of the results of
untried policies."
41. Statement of Secretary of State for the Environment on the Greater Lon-
don Development Plan, para. 6 (Feb. 1973).
42. The Greater London Development Plan consisted of three documents: a
Written Statement, a Road Map, and a Metropolitan Structure Map. Unfortu-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/3
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IV. POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT
One of the Plan's objectives was to restrain the decline in London's
population, so that by 1981 it would number between 7.0 and 7.3
million persons. Among the dire consequences feared if the figure fell
below that level were an imbalance in the supply of and demand for
labour, more commuting, a loss of young, skilled, and well-educated
people whose presence is essential to a balanced community, and high
rate burdens for those who remained. The Panel rejected this view,
concluding that no significant disadvantage was to be feared from a
population lower than that envisaged by the Plan and positive ad-
vantages would occur in terms of a more spacious environment. The
Panel took the view that local planning authories are only able to
exert a marginal influence on the size, distribution, and composition
of a population, and that estimates that assume that policies can
arrest a decline are unrealistic. On the available information, the
Panel concluded that the population of London in 1981 could well
be in the range of 6.37 to 6.55 million, and could fall to 6.0 million
by 1991. The Government has expressed general agreement with the
Panel's observations and feels it right to plan for a London popula-
tion in 1981 of significantly less than 7.0 million people.
The Plan contained two main employment policies: first, to use
floor space controls to relate supply to demand and to concentrate
new office developments into specific locations; secondly, to reduce
the rate at which employment was leaving London. The Panel's view
was that the first policy was over-ambitious since a local planning
authority could only marginally influence the scale and location of
employment within its area. All that could be hoped for was to deal
with medium-term problems in the balance of supply and demand
between different employment sectors in the London area. Further-
more, the Panel felt that since there was no regular relationship
between floor space and the number of people employed, the use of
floor space controls for bringing demand and supply into balance
should be rejected. On the question of reducing the rate at which
nately, the Written Statement, which formed the basic text of the Plan, had
become out-of-date by the time the Inquiry opened in 1970. The Greater London
Council was forced, therefore, to propose numerous modifications to the Written
Statement during the course of the Inquiry. In the text that follows, the author
has refrained from giving full and detailed references to the content of the original
Written Statement or to the proposed modifications. To have done so in a mean-
ingful way would probably have resulted in the length of footnotes exceeding the
length of the commentary.
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employment was leaving London, the Panel rejected the view that
this would have an adverse effect on the income of Londoners by
removing the better jobs and thought that on balance a decline in
employment was likely to lead to better conditions both for those
who stayed and those who left. The Government has broadly ac-
cepted the Panel's approach, though it has reserved position on those
recommendations that affect national policy. One of those recom-
mendations was that the nationally controlled system of office develop-
ment permits, whereby a developer must obtain a government permit
before he can apply for planning permission for office development
in certain parts of the country, be abandoned, leaving office develop-
ment control entirely in the hands of the local planning authority.43
V. HOUSING
It has been in this area that the views of the Plan, the Panel and
the Government are in closest accord. The main plank in the housing
policy for Greater London is the improvement and rehabilitation of
older housing stock. In addition, the Panel believes that the rate of
new construction must be stepped up, and that it may be necessary
to use land that serves little purpose as Green Belt for house building.
The Government agrees with this recommendation, and with the
recommendation that the rate of overspill housing should be in-
creased.
VI. TRANSPORT, TRAFFIC AND ROADS
It is axiomatic that policies for movement in densely populated
urban areas require a co-ordinated approach between the fields of
public transport, traffic management, and road building and improve-
ment. The seeds of controversy arise in mixing the respective in-
gredients. The Panel felt that public transport should be given a
higher priority than was proposed in the Plan, a conclusion that the
Government has accepted. Some of the measures envisaged include
the development of a system of reserved lanes for buses and taxis
and the improvement of interchanges between rail, bus and car. As
regards traffic management, the Government accepts the view that
traffic must be canalised onto the most suitable routes and that traffic
restraint should be increased. This restraint would include restrict-
43. Statement of Secretary of State for the Environment on the Greater Lon-
don Development Plan, paras. 9-23 (Feb. 1973).
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ing both on and off-street parking, making owners of vehicles as well
as their drivers liable for parking offences, and introducing (though
not prematurely) schemes of area licensing, whereby a supplementary
license would be required to use a car in certain parts of London.
The Plan's road proposals caused the greatest controversy, account-
ing for 21,000 of the 28,000 objections lodged against the Plan. Lon-
don's existing primary road system strongly encouraged radial move-
ment by prohibiting orbital movement, except via roads that are not
sited or constructed to carry heavy and continuous motor traffic. To
meet this difficulty, the Plan postulated the construction of three
orbital ringways, or motorway "boxes"-Ringway 1 skirting inner
London, Ringway 2 running through London's suburbs roughly
along the line of an existing inadequate circular route, and Ringway
3 skirting the Greater London Council boundary. In its Report, the
Panel accepted the need for Ringway 1, recommended that Ringway
2 should proceed in a much watered-down form, and rejected Ring-
way 3 in its entirety. The Panel believed that Ringway 1 would have
a high potential in attracting traffic that would otherwise use central
London streets. Radial roads linked to it would provide convenient
routes for much of the traffic to and from suburban areas, so that the
elimination of Ringway 2 would not lead to excessive loads on the
secondary road network. Nevertheless, that part of the Ringway 2
route which was already in existence as a north circular route is to
remain as an improved all-purpose road. The Government has ac-
cepted the Panel's recommendations as regards Ringways 1 and 2 but
requires more time to consider the recommendation that Ringway 3
be struck from the Plan. A curious feature of these conclusions is
that Ringivay 3, which caused the least controversy, has been rejected
by the Panel, whilst Ringway 1, which caused the greatest, has been
approved.
CONCLUSIONS
The story has no end. Shortly after the announcement of the Gov-
ernment's views on the Plan and Panel Report, a Labour administra-
tion totally opposed to the construction of all ringways was elected
to office in the Greater London Council, replacing the Conservative
administration that had submitted the Plan. With any other struc-
ture plan, all or part of it may be withdrawn so long as it has not
been formally approved, a feature that emphasises the political nature
of development plans. In the case of the Greater London Develop-
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ment Plan, however, this power was not available, so that the new
administration must hope that the Secretary of State for the Environ-
ment, who is the confirming authority, will give effect to the policy
on which the new administration was elected. Whether the Secretary
will do so is a matter of pure speculation. If he accommodates the
new administration's views, it will constitute in law a draft modifi-
cation to the Plan and will involve a further public inquiry. If he
does not and approves the Ringway proposals, two courses appear
open to the Greater London Council. First, it may submit to the
Secretary of State an amendment to the then-approved development
plan, and so begin again the process of public participation and
public inquiry. Secondly, it may simply do nothing.
In its statement of views on the Plan and the Panel's Report, the
Government emphasised that planning in London-particularly plan-
ning for traffic-was in danger of coming to a halt. That possibility
may now happen. Indeed, with such strong conflicts of opinion, it
may have become inevitable.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/3
